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"While securing compensation to the holders of copyrights
was an essential purpose of [the Copyright] Act, freezing
existing economic arrangements for doing so was not."'
-U.S.

Supreme Court, Teleprompter v. CBS

The fair use doctrine permits certain uses of copyrighted material
that are unauthorized by the copyright holder. In 1984, the Supreme
Court decided that unauthorized home taping of television programs
was a "fair use" of such programs.2 Decried by the dissent and frequently contested in ensuing cases, that decision sealed the majority's
case that the videotape
recorder 3 was capable of substantial non4
infringing uses.
t Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I would like to thank Jacqui Lipton and the organizers of the symposium for inviting me to participate. I also thank Jake Barnes, Charles Sullivan, Shavar Jeffries, Gaia Bernstein, and other Seton Hall colleagues for their
incisive and constructive comments.
I Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 n.15 (1974).
2 Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
Though the landmark Sony v. Universal Pictures case is remembered primarily for its limitation
of liability for contributory infringement, that part of the holding rested in part on a perhaps
more fundamental decision: that personal copying of televised programs was a "fair use" of the
material. To demonstrate that the VTR was not simply an instrument of infringement, but also
had substantial non-infringing uses, the Court held "unauthorized home time-shifting" (i.e., a
viewer's taping a program in order to watch it later than its original broadcast) was a "fair use"
of the program under § 107 of the Copyright Act. Id.
3 Throughout this piece I shall refer to the contested technology interchangeably as either
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In the twenty years since Sony, the dissent's skepticism about the
fairness of time-shifting has gotten about as warm a reception in appellate courts as the majority's position. This is unfortunate because
the Sony majority solved a problem internal to the fair use doctrine in
a way that made economic, legal, and moral sense. Courts have been
sharply divided on how to assess the effect of a contested use on the
"market for or value of' the plaintiffs copyrighted work-a key factor in fair use analysis. The Sony majority broadly considered the
effect of the contested use on the value of the copyrighted work overall, rather than narrowly considering its effect on the licensing market
most directly affected by the contested use. However, many recent
appellate decisions have cut this inquiry short by ignoring Sony's
method and applying the following standard articulated in Justice
Blackmun's dissent:
[A]n infringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that
the copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's
action. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has resulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice.
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation
from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise
be willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work.5
This idea comes out of thin air, grounded neither in the relevant statutory language nor in any convincing economic or moral analysis of
the technology involved. This narrow approach inevitably degenerates into circularity, as it assumes the legal status of the work it is
supposed to help determine. 6 As Nimmer explains,

a videotape recorder or videocassette recorder. It is interesting to note at the outset that the
technology at stake could have been disabled in order to assure that it could only play videocassettes, and not record them. However, the Supreme Court appeared never to seriously consider
this technology-tailoring option-a reluctance echoed in the recent decision of the D.C. Circuit
to prevent the Federal Communications Commission to impose a "broadcast flag" on new
technology in order to prevent unauthorized copying of content.
4 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court needed to reach this issue to determine Sony's
liability because many important owners of audiovisual content, including the major sports
leagues, had declared that they did not object to home taping, and taping of that content may
well have constituted a substantial non-infringing use. However, it did need to reach the issue
in order to determine the liability of the individuals sued by the copyright holders.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6 A circular argument is invalid because it presumes the conclusion it seeks to vindicate.
Since a "fair use" finding can be construed as a "taking" of intellectual property, it is useful to
look to the literature on takings in order to fully understand the force of the circularity critique
here. See, e.g, Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: ConsideringInherent
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1996) (commenting on the Supreme Court's
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[A] potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always
been supplanted in every fair use case, to the extent that the
defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of plaintiffs work, which use could in turn be defined in terms of the
relevant potential market. In other words, it is a given in
every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential
market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for
licensing the very use at bar.7
If the dissent were correct, this fair use factor would always militate
against a fair use finding. Nevertheless, Blackmun's narrow approach
has informed "effect on the market" analysis in several leading fair
uses cases, and proven decisive to their resolutions.8
As a result, lawyers, legal scholars, and judges have struggled to
define the scope and force of Sony's fair use holding for the past
twenty years. At its narrowest, the decision merely carves out an
exception for personal copying (bordering on the de minimis) in cases
when excessively high transaction fees would make licensing impossible. 9 As copyrighted content migrates online, and micropayment
systems proliferate,' 0 such a narrow interpretation would soon render
Sony's precedent obsolete."1 Worried by the trend from fair use to

"hopelessly circular inquiry into reasonable investment-backed expectations" in the context of
takings cases). But see Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity,49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1
(2001) (describing various controversies in constitutional law in which circular reasoning is
inevitable).
7 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A)(4)

(2004).
8 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386-87 (6th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that defendant's photocopying of plaintiff's copyrighted work was
not a fair use because it harmed the reasonable potential market value of the copyrighted
works); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir.1995) (same).
9 The scholarly community has long taken Wendy Gordon's 1983 article, Fair Use as
Market Failure,to be the locus classicus for this point of view. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure: A Structuraland EconomicAnalysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982) (asserting that "the courts and Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of
effectuation through the market"). However, she clearly does not take the position that all uses
that can be paid for should be paid for. See Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failureand Intellectual
Property:A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002) (responding to criticisms may by Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., in Fair Use and Market Failure:Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975,987-91 (2002).
10 Micropayments are "small digital payments of between a quarter and a fraction of a
penny." Clay Shirky, Fame v. Fortune: Micropayments and Free Content, first published
September 5, 2003 on the "Networks, Economics, and Culture" mailing list, available at
http://www.shirkey.com/writings/fame-vs-fortune.html.
Internet services like BitPass,
FirstVirtual, Cybercoin, Millicent, Digicash, Internet Dollar, and Pay2See have served as micropayment systems.
I See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 224 (1st ed., Hill and Wang 1994) (as-
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"fared use,"' 12 several commentators have attempted to interpret Sony
more broadly. For example, Glynn Lunney has claimed that Sony
requires courts to permit copying as fair use if the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that the harm to its interests outweighs the general societal interest in the copying. 13
While by no means contradicting Lunney's approach, this article
sets itself a more modest task. Although scholars have interpreted
Sony expansively to "rationally revitalize" fair use doctrine generally,
Sony's potential to rationalize one specific aspect of the extant fair
use test-the analysis of the effect of the use on the "market for or

serting that micropayment systems "should substantially reduce the specter of transaction costs.
As these costs dissolve, so, too, should the perceived need for safety valves such as fair use.")
(quoted in JULIE COHEN, ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 566
(2003)). Goldstein's arguments have been amply discredited. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The
Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the
Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1168-69 (2000) (noting that the "consolidation of authority over
rights may reduce competition and lead to coercion"); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish?
Economic Analysis, Price Discriminationand Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2007, 2019 (2000) (explaining the aspects of fair use despite improved pricing methods available); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1819 (2000)
(noting the importance of "an economic model that focuses on creating the conditions for random or fortuitous access to copyrighted content"). Several commentators have noted chilling
effects due to permission requirements. See, e.g., Negativland, Two Relationships to a Cultural
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 239, 257 (2003) ("The dangers to collage from
payment and permission requirements also include the aspect of affordability .... Purchasing a
single sample can run anywhere from hundreds to many thousands of dollars, depending on
what the owner arbitrarily thinks the potential sales traffic will bear").
12 Tom Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright'sFairUse Doctrine, Social Science Research Network, at
http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 11456 (last visited May 20, 2005).
1- As Lunney observes:

Once we acknowledge the public good character of copyrighted works, then, from an
economic perspective, fair use must necessarily balance, on the one hand, the potential public benefit of additional or better works from prohibiting the use at issue, and
on the other, the potential public benefit from the use itself. In applying this balance,
we should not tie ourselves to a set of restrictive factors developed in the nineteenth
century to address a particular type of use against the background of the technology
available at that time. Rather, we should consider directly what the public has to
gain and what it has to lose for the use at issue given today's technology and associated market structures. Under this balancing approach,a use should be found unfair
and hence infringing only where the copyright owner has proven by the preponderance of the evidence that society has more to gain than it has to lose by prohibiting
the use at issue.
Glynn S. Lunney, supra note 9, at 1030 (emphasis added). Though Lunney makes a compelling
case for this broad interpretation as a matter of policy and even doctrine, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will adopt it any time soon. Having applied the four-factor fair use test in leading fair use cases for at least the past 20 years, the Court is unlikely to abandon it now. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony, 464
U.S. 417 (1984). However, this article does advance a method for addressing some of Lunney's
concerns in copyright jurisprudence on the fourth fair use factor.
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value of the copyrighted work" 4-remains largely unexplored and
unrealized.' 5 In this area, Sony's example-the elevation of a careful
and detailed district court record finding no demonstrated negative
effect on sales for the work-has been all too often ignored by appellate courts reluctant to examine the full range of economic effects
flowing from a given use.
After introducing the fair use doctrine generally in Part 2, this
piece focuses on the debate between the dissent and the majority in
Sony over the fourth fair use factor in Part 3.16 Part 4 sketches an
economic rationale for the Sony majority's fourth factor analysis,
focusing on network effects, externalities, and the impossibility of
forcing compensation for all complementarity in a modem market
economy. 17
Sony's lesson for analysis of the fourth factor is clear. Assessing
the effect of a new technology on the value of a copyrighted work
always involves the evaluation of several markets for the
work-some of which may only be possible due to the technology at
issue, and all of which are bound to be affected in different ways and
to a different extent if the use becomes widespread. Courts should
not cut the analysis short by simply focusing on one negatively affected market.
I. FAIR USE'S ACHILLES HEEL: CIRCULAR EFFECT ON THE MARKET
ANALYSIS

In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress codified the fair use doctrine
as the first of fourteen statutory limits on the powers of copyright
holders. The fair use doctrine guarantees the right to use copyrighted
material without the permission of its owner. The meaning of the fair
use doctrine is deeply unsettled. The statutory test codifying the doctrine requires courts to address four factors:

14
15

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2004).
The best recent scholarship on fourth factor analysis includes Gregory M. Duhl, Old

Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S.

Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665 (2004); Africa, supra note I1;and Lydia Loren,
infra note 80. Africa, Loren, and Duhl advocate the expansion of fair use doctrine in order to
reflect the social benefits of unauthorized access. This piece builds on their work by offering an
argument for a particular method of fourth factor analysis that promises to expand fair use,
respect the genuine commercial interests of copyright holders, and rescue the relevant portion of
the Copyright Act from repeated misinterpretation by appellate courts.
16The Appendix offers a schematic representation of this debate.
17 This piece does not focus on the question of whether, as a matter of construing doctrine
extant in 1984, the Sony majority or dissent was "right" about its treatment of the fourth factor.
So much has happened in fair use case law since then that such an inquiry would be of mere
academic interest today.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A
[enumerating copyright holders' rights], the fair use of a
copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.'
However, neither the statute nor its legislative history give much
guidance on how to apply the factors, or on their proper weight. 19 As
technologies of copying have exponentially increased in availability
and effectiveness, ° so too have the number and diversity of fair use
defenses to copyright infringement actions. 2 1 The resulting doctrinal
disarray has provoked both scholars and judges to propose reforms.22
18 17 U.S.C. § 107.
19David Nimmer, 'Fairest of Them All' and Other Fair Use Fairy Tales, 66 LAW &
CONTEP. PROBS. 263 (2003) (observing that "Basically, had Congress legislated a dartboard
rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the
upshot would be the same.").
20 Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets
for Ideas: Copyright and FairUse in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 209,

223 (1985) (noting that it took approximately one man-year to copy a book on paper in 1000
A.D., but took less than an hour to photocopy the same in the late twentieth century); see also
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHt. L. REV. 263, 268 (2002) (outlining in great detail the
declining cost of copying).
21 Julie Cohen and her coauthors classify three broad types of fair use cases: cultural interchange, consumptive/productive use, and technical use. See Cohen, supra note I1, at 496.
22 Many commentators have convincingly argued that the proper policy here is to split the
right to compensation from the right to control. If courts were able to permit innovators to
appropriate certain IP, while assuring some fair return to its owner, both opportunities for present innovation and incentives for past innovation could be preserved. So far only Congressional action has led to such compulsory licensing schemes, but courts could in principle impose
such remedies.
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Recognizing the emptiness of the second and third factors,23 and
the manipulability of the first, 24 the Supreme Court and several appellate courts have focused on the fourth factor in fair use cases. The
factor's prescribed "effect on the market analysis" has assumed great
importance: it was called "undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use" in the landmark decision, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,26 and has been critical to the holding in several cases. As the Nimmer treatise states, "[f]air use, when
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied. 27
Like the fair use doctrine generally, "effect on the market" analysis
is in flux. There are a few fixed guideposts: clearly commercial uses
are suspect, and "transformative" or "productive" uses are treated
more favorably than mere copying.28 Courts must keep in mind not
23 Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002).

Factors (1) and (2) are empty, except that (1) suggests a preference for noncommercial educational uses, picking up the reference earlier in the statute to
"teaching ... scholarship or research." Factor (3) is inapplicable to Beanie Babies,
each one of which is copyrighted separately, so that there can be no partial copying
as a matter of fact (no one, we imagine, wants a photograph of part of a Beanie
Baby).
Id. Ironically, to the degree that the home tapers copied the entire work and watched all of it
(including the ads, in the manner the plaintiffs hoped they would), that may well have counted
against them in the third factor inquiry (the amount and substantiality of the use).
24 The key determinations in the first factor are commerciality (which goes to the purpose
of the use) and transformativeness (which goes to the character of the use). Definitions of
commerciality are notoriously divergent. Compare A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing private copying as commercial) with Sony, 464 U.S.
417 (characterizing such copying as noncommercial). The vanishingly thin line between parody
and satire is a classic example of the degree of judicial discretion permitted in the "transformativeness" determination. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
25 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see NIMMER,
supra note 7, at § 13.05[A][4] ("If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated
rationale, this emerges as the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor."); but see the
Second Circuit's rejection of this idea:
Prior to Campbell, the Supreme Court had characterized the fourth factor as "the single most important element of fair use," Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; accord 3
Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][4], at 13-183. However, Campbell's discussion of
the fourth factor conspicuously omits this phrasing. Apparently abandoning the idea
that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell instructs that '[a]ll [four factors] are to be
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.'
Amer. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cit. 1994) (quoting Campbell,
510 U.S. at 576 (1994)). The Nimmer treatise continues to advance the effective primacy of the
fourth factor, via its proposed "functional test" for fair use. NIMMER, supra note 7, at §
13.05[A][4].
26471 U.S. 539 (1985).
27NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 1.10[D]; see also NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 13.05[A] (collecting cases).
28"If the intended use is for commercial gain, [the] likelihood [of market harm] may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated."
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. However, "[n]o 'presumption' or inference of market harm that might
find support in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplication for
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only the case at hand, but also its potential ramifications: a use is not
fair if "it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work" should it "become widespread., 29 The assessment is
rife with hypotheticals: the court has to assess effect on the potential
market for the work and for derivative works, if the examined use
were to become widespread.3 °
These three elements of the determination require courts to predict
the future development of the use at issue. Assessing the effect of an
allegedly infringing use or derivative work on the "marketability" of
copyrighted material is a difficult task. Similar factual situations have
been treated differently by the courts. Internet catalogs of photos are
a fair use, 31 yet catalogs of very brief clips of films are not. 32 A dull
and complicated collector's guide is a fair use, while a more colorful
and simple one is not.33 The resulting uncertainty has dampened both
innovation and the equitable distribution of extant technology. Fair
use could be an important tool in combating this trend, if innovators
had a better idea of its meaning and extent. Recovering the Sony majority's effort to strengthen and clarify fair use would be an important
step toward promoting equitable legal approaches to innovation.

1I.

SONY'S FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS

After a long silence on the issue, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the meaning of the fair use doctrine in Sony by determining
whether home videotaping of freely broadcast television programs
was a fair use of the programs. Addressing the first factor, the majority found that while the character of the use (mere copying) was nontransformative (a strike against fair use), the purpose of the use was
noncommercial, and therefore the first factor militated in favor of the
copiers. The majority essentially ignored the second and third factors, asserting without argument that they did not weigh against timeshifting even though normally one might expect that each would.34

commercial purposes." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (giving the benefit of the doubt to "productive" or "transformative" uses).
29 Sony., 464 U.S. at 451 (the more transformative the use, the less the "effect on the market" analysis matters); see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003),
(quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
30 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1980); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing harm to
market for derivative works).
31 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 811.
32 Video Pipeline, Inc. v.

Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1052 (2004).
33 Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
34 "[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work, see 17
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The majority reserved its most comprehensive analysis for its discussion of the fourth fair use factor, "the effect of the35use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.,
Given that the use at issue was noncommercial, the burden was on
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that home videotaping impaired the marketability of their work.36 Opting decisively for a complex analysis of
the multiple markets for copyrighted films, programs, and serials at
issue, the district court examined in some detail the videotape recorder ("VTR")'s effect on each of the markets. Since the Sony majority relied heavily on the district court's analysis in its own fair use
discussion, it is helpful to review the district court's approach in some
detail before discussing the conflict between the Sony majority and
dissent.
A.

The DistrictCourt'sAnalysis of the Effect of the VTR

Universal Studios and Disney launched the case against the VTR's
manufacturers, advertisers, and a sample of users accused of taping
programs. The district court offered a detailed account of the plaintiffs' complaint,37 and sketched the business model of the industry
plaintiffs. This effort to understand the full scope of sales and contracts for the copyrighted audiovisual works at issue was essential to
its effort to assess the full range of effects of the VTR.
Explaining Universal's business model, the district court noted that
the studio licensed films in at least five different markets:
" Theater and television (first run)
* Network telecasts (two or three runs)
" Local telecasts (three to eight runs)
" Theater redistribution

U. S. C. § 107(2) (1982 ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work
which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is

reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use." Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
35 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).

36Sony, 464 U.S. at 484.
37 Id. The plaintiffs offered a detailed complaint, charging one defendant's son had made
tapes of "Pluto's Quinpuplets" and another defendant had copied "This is Your Life Donald
Duck".
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D Rentals to consumers, schools and institutions in the "non38
theatrical 16 mm and 8 mm exhibition markets.
Successive distribution to each of these outlets reflected the studios'
39
exploitation of price discrimination according to willingness to pay.
Like the more-expensive hardcover that precedes paperback works,
more-expensive access to movies (via tickets) comes before network
telecasts (which only "cost" the consumer a viewing of commercials).
The district court also noted that Universal had begun "marketing
4°
theatrical motion pictures on prerecorded videodiscs.
This survey of the main methods of commercial exploitation of the
works at issue results in two important current markets for the work
(theater showings and television broadcasts) and one potential market
(sale of videodiscs). The district court patiently examined the effect
of VTRs on all these markets, based on the record then available.
After that analysis, it examined the effect of VTRs on the market for
prerecorded videodiscs. 4 1
1. Overall Demandfor Live Television and Theater Exhibitions
The district court reviewed the plaintiff s evidence on the effect of
the VTR on movie theater releases in a focused but skeptical manner.
The court noted that this evidence indicated that "83.2% reported
'4 2 The
their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax.
remaining respondents were discounted by the district court. As it
explained,
[p]laintiffs predict that live television or movie audiences will
decrease as more people watch Betamax tapes as an alternative. Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies
when they would otherwise be watching television or going
to the movie theater. There is no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax owners will
play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
38 Id. at 433.
39 For a general discussion of this practice see RICHARD CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE (2000).
40 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Amer.,

480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
41 The dissent's proposed standard would permit the plaintiffs to prevail on the fourth factor, "effect on the market" analysis simply by demonstrating that VCR-copied tapes would
substitute for commercially sold tapes for some identifiable segment of consumers. Even more
tautologically, the narrow approach endorsed by the dissent would deny a positive "fourth
factor" finding to any "group' to which the copyright holder wanted to deny access and end the
case simply by looking at the effect of the VTR on the videodisc market.
42 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 439.
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to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey
does not show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on
television viewing or theater attendance.43
Strictly speaking, the survey showed some negative effect-not every
respondent claimed their viewing habits were unaffected. However,
the effect was deemed trivial by the district court.
The district court's skepticism was warranted by microeconomic
theory, which predicts not onlycompetitive, but also symbiotic results
arising from the introduction of new viewing options into the market
for entertainment. In classic microeconomic terms, we might classify
the potential effects of VTR usage on live TV and theater viewing as
either substitutional or complementary. 44 To the extent the plaintiffs'
predictions of reduced viewership held true, the VTR would be a substitute for live viewership. However, to the extent that VTRs encouraged viewers to become more dedicated to certain programs or stars,
or whetted their appetite for audiovisual works generally, they would
complement live viewership. Demand for VTR-recorded material
would then "spill-over" into demand for more live material, instead of
"compensating" for its lack.45
Elevating the importance of the fourth fair use factor (and the
Nimmer treatise's "functional test"46), Judge Posner held in Ty, Inc. v.
PIL that
copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in
the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use,
but copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in
the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws), or for
derivative works from the copyrighted work.47

43 See

EATON,

ET

AL.,

MICROECONOMICS

popcorn ... are.., examples of complements ....

97

(2002)

("[m]ovies

and

Coke and Pepsi... might be thought of as

substitutes."). Formally speaking, the demand for a good rises when the price of its complement
falls or when the price of its substitute rises. Id.
44 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002), for a full explanation of
the distinction between substitutional and complimentary.
45 Jon Elster's delineation of "compensation" and "spill-over" effects is less economistic
than the average substitute/complement analysis, and is particularly helpful in analyzing "creative industries." See JOHN ELSTER, NuTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1989).
46 NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 13.05.
47 Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 517, citing NIMMER, supra note 7, at §13.05[B][l]; see Davis v.
The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2001); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (concurring opinion); Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983); Gordon, supranote 9, at 1643
n.237 (1982).
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As the VTR shows, many uses can have both complementary and
substitutive effects-for example, recordings may substitute for live
viewing, or may whet viewers' appetites for more of it. In cases like
this, courts tend either to focus their attention on the one substitutive
effect (the narrow approach), or to weigh the relative strength of the
complementary and substitutive uses. Aided by the district court's
comprehensive analysis, the Sony majority was able to complete the
latter, fairer analysis. Its method suggests that, where substitutional
and complementary effects of a use are plausible, and roughly the
same in magnitude, the fourth fair use factor should not weigh in favor of the plaintiff.
2. Advertising
The bulk of the district court's "effect on the market" analysis focused on the VTR's impact on the value of advertising sold by the
stations which bought the programs from Disney and Universal. Both
sides in the litigation appeared to agree that the primary monetary
value of the content was to generate viewership of advertising. 48 The
plaintiffs worried that the VTR would upset this classic business
model, and had some evidence to back up their worries, including
expert testimony and an extensive survey of VTR use. However, the
district court ultimately concluded that all of the potential future
harms depended on far too many assumptions to be recognized as
clearly reducing the value of the works in question.
a. Measurement of Advertising Audiences
The plaintiffs first worried that Arbitron and Nielsen would not
count the viewership of recorded programming, so that they would
not be compensated for the viewers delivered to advertisers during
that viewing time. The district court observed that the problem of
measurement was crucial to the question of compensation, 49 but ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs' measurement concerns as speculative.
Since "[b]oth Nielsen and Arbitron have conducted pilot surveys with
videotape recorder owners in order to develop a framework for additional survey work," the district court was confident they would eventually resolve the measurement issue.50
48 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 440-41.

49See Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 440-41 ("[T]he fees which advertisers pay
networks and stations to show their commercials (sometimes measured in "cost per thousand,"
e.g., $5/1000 households) are influenced substantially by the size and demographics of the
audience which the programs (and hence the commercials) are expected to reach."). Id.
50Id. at 441.
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With this determination, the burden of improving measurement
methods was essentially internalized to the content providers as opposed to the VTR hardware makers. The court could perhaps have
required the VTR makers to track viewership, but made no effort to
do so, recognizing that the VTR could have as many positive as negative effects on the relevant copyright holders.
b. Loss of Advertising Audience
The plaintiffs' more serious challenge to the VTR was their claim
that users would simply skip advertising by fast-forwarding through
it. If that happened, and Nielsen and Arbitron were able to measure
it, the viewing audience might be significantly reduced. The plaintiffs put forward survey evidence to demonstrate that fast-forwarding
was, if not a practice of a majority of viewers, at the very least widespread. The district court, however, saw the glass as half full rather
than half empty, observing that "58.3% of the owners eliminate
commercials from the recording either 'sometimes,' 'rarely,' or
'never'; 56.1% use the fast-forward to pass commercials either
'sometimes,' 'rarely,' or 'never.''
There was not much evidence
offered on the relative prevalence of hometaping,5 z and it's unclear
exactly how valuable it would have been, since the fourth factor requires consideration of the effect on the potential value of the work
"if the use were to become widespread." Perhaps the court's doubt
about the impact of such "message evasion" arose from the common
experience of ignoring commercials or exiting the room or changing
the channel when they are aired during normal broadcasts. In any
event, even ifthe plaintiffs could demonstrate a more significant impact on their advertising revenue, the court was skeptical about how
conclusive that should be to the overall fourth factor analysis:

5'Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 439:
To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward and, for the
most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For most recordings, either
practice may be too tedious. As defendants' survey showed, 92% of the programs
were recorded with commercials and only 25% of the owners fast-forward through
them.
Id. at 468. In his 1982 Congressional testimony, Motion Picture Association of America President Jack Valenti claimed that "86.8 percent of all these owners erase or skip commercials."
Home Recordings of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R.
5250, H.R. 5488, H.R., and H.R. 5705 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong
(1982), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Association of America).
52 The district court, citing the $875 cost of the machine however appeared to be skeptical
of its prevalence at least one point in the opinion. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 451.
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[Plaintiffs' concerns] surface from a system of marketing
which developed because producers and broadcasters could

control the time at which the public views materials beamed
to them over public airwaves. The Betamax reduces that control, and plaintiffs predict that harm will result. Because this
prediction of harm is based on so many assumptions and on a
system of marketing which is rapidly changing, this court is
hesitant to identify "probable effects" of home-use copying.53

The district court's skepticism applied not merely to the plaintiffs'
claims about advertising, but also to their case as a whole. It observed a long list of assumptions that were both central to the plain54
tiffs' case and "to some extent inconsistent and illogical.,

For example, the plaintiffs claimed that the more viewers watched
the original showing of a program via VTR, the smaller the ensuing

rerun audiences and royalties for syndication. However, as the district court observed, these royalties were themselves based on the size
of the original audience. So the more people who watched the program (either via VTR or directly broadcast), the higher these licensing
fees would be.55

53Id. at 451-52.
5 Id. at 451. To wit:
1.Plaintiffs first assume that a large proportion of the 75 million television households in this country will in the near future own the Betamax machine which today
costs approximately $ 875.
2. [T]hen they assume that a significantly large number of these Betamax owners
will have both the financial ability and the desire to buy many Betamax tapes (today
costing approximately $20 each) to record movies and episodes from TV series.
3. [A]nd that they will keep these tapes for repeat viewing over many years.
4. They further assume that a viewer will watch these Betamax playbacks at a time
when he would otherwise be watching live television.
5. Plaintiffs also assume that even if the tapes were not kept over a long period of
time, Betamax owners will still injure the value of their copyrights by deleting commercials from movies and television series.
6. Furthermore, plaintiffs assume that because the Betamax allows more persons to
view the original telecast, fewer persons will be in the rerun audience.. [slome of
these assumptions are based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that
they are to some extent inconsistent and illogical.
Id.

55Id. The district court further observed that
Plaintiffs fear that time-shifting will reduce audiences for telecast reruns. The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. Plaintiffs explain that the
Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people
there are in this original audience, the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current
marketing practices, including the success of syndication, show just the opposite.
Today, the larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters for rerun rights. There is no survey within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have
not seen the program. In any event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, original
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Yet the internal inconsistency of some of the plaintiffs' more aggressive claims was not fatal to their case. Far more damaging was
an insistence that the courts move in to prohibit purely private uses of
copyrighted work merely in order to preserve existing methods of
doing business. The district court refused to permit a fair use finding
to hinge on the particular methods of doing business that happened to
be prevalent at the time:
[P]laintiffs claim that this copying indirectly reduces the
revenue by affecting ratings and advertising. If this is true,
plaintiffs have marketing alternatives at hand to recoup some
of that predicted loss. They stand ready to make their product
available in cassettes and compete with the VTR industry.
They have proven resilient to change in market practices arising from other technological inventions, E. g., cable television, pay television. 6
The district court did not burden the defendants with demonstrating
the existence of such "marketing" options, nor did it try to specify
them itself. Rather, it distinguished between a claim for protecting
copyrights and a claim for insulating prevailing business practices
from market and technological pressures.
The district court's words here may only look prescient with the
benefit of hindsight; no one predicted in the pleadings the rapid rise
of the video rental market, which has generated tens of billions of
dollars for the studios since the mid 1980s.57 The dei ex machinae
Blockbuster and Netflix cannot by themselves justify the district
court's arguments here. However, no matter what one thinks of the
ultimate result of the district court's inquiry, respect for its method is
warranted. Judge Ferguson carefully considered the evidence offered
by the plaintiffs, and critically examined it in light of prevailing industry practices, contradictory evidence, and a baseline expectation of
the reasonable rate of return necessary to foster creative work in a
given industry. Despite the difficulty of the task, the district court
took very seriously the statutory mandate to consider all potential
effects of the use on the value of the relevant copyrighted works.

audiences may increase and, given current market practices, this should aid plaintiffs
rather than harm them.
Id. at 466.
56 Sony, 480 F. Supp at 452.
57 William Fisher, Don't Beat Them, Join Them, N.Y. TIMES June 25, 2004, at A23.
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B. The Appellate Opinion
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit had little tolerance for the district
court's searching inquiry. To the appellate panel, the fourth factor
finding was obvious: "Since the copies made by home videorecording
are used for the same purpose as the original, a finding of fair use is
not justified. 5 8 The panel's eminently contestable characterization of
the home taping as commercial-a first factor finding-was dispositive as to the fourth factor inquiry as well. Having little patience for
the district court's appreciation of the evolution of the broadcasting
industry and emerging marketing alternatives, the panel focused on a
narrow market (the sale of tapes) and one particular effect of taping
(the potential for tape libraries to crowd out later authorized sales of
tapes).5 9 Since "home users assign economic value to their ability to
have control over access to copyrighted works," the panel concluded
that "[t]he copyright laws would seem to require that60 the copyright
owner be given the opportunity to exploit this market.,
The appellate opinion's cursory consideration of the fourth factor
foreshadows the Sony dissent's descent into full-fledged circularity.
Assuming that consumer practices revealed a commodifiable preference for "control" over broadcast works, the appellate panel went on
to presume that the copyright holder must not only have the right to
exploit that market, but to hold liable any party aiding the evasion of
that right. There is no sense of the principle implicit in the method of
the district court opinion-that the fourth factor analysis requires an
assessment of all the effects of a contested use on the value of the
copyrighted works at issue, including all markets for those works. It
is difficult to see how, under the Ninth Circuit's methodology, any
use could be fair. As Part IV on the legacy of the Sony dissent demonstrates, just such reasoning has emerged to threaten classic educational fair uses 6 1 and creative or innovative uses that even theoretically usurp the empire of licensing the appellate panel would mechanically protect.62
58 Universal Cities Studios v. Sony, 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting the troubling trend, echoed in Blackmun's language, toward assuming that a negative fourth factor
finding should lead to no fair use at all).
59 Id. ("The district court seems to recognize, on several occasions, that appellants will
have to take affirmative steps to compete with the appropriated versions of their work.").
6 Id.

61See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a commercial copyshop who reproduced works for "coursepacks" violated the fair
use doctrine).
62 Mattel Inc.v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an artist
producing and selling photographs containing Mattel's "Barbie" doll nude and in danger of
being attacked constituted fair use); Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132
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C. The Sony Majority: Negative Effect on One of Many Markets Not
Relevant
The Ninth Circuit's narrow view of fourth factor analysis has continued to gain currency in the courts of appeals in part because the
Sony majority's dismissal of the plaintiffs' version of that argument
was deflected into a footnote to the court's discussion of thefirst factor-the purpose and character of the use. The plaintiffs had claimed
that "'consumptive uses of copyrights by home VTR users are commercial even if the consumer does not sell the homemade tape because the consumer will not buy tapes separately sold by the copyright holder.' ' 63 Since the argument works just as well to demonstrate a necessarily negative effect on at least one potential market for
the copyrighted works-namely, "tapes separately sold by the copyright holder"-it would be enough to guarantee a negative fourth factor finding, according to the Ninth Circuit.
Such a ruling would automatically discount the potential positive
effects of the VTR. As the district court noted, the copyright holders
lost sales to "time-shifters-turned-archivists" who would have purchased an authorized tape but for the VTR might be more than offset
by other marketing alternatives created by the VTR. 64 The Sony majority pushed this argument a step further:
The time-shifter no more steals the program by watching it
once than does the live viewer, and the live viewer is no more
likely to buy prerecorded videotapes than is the time-shifter.
Indeed, no live viewer would buy a prerecorded videotape if
he did not have access to a VTR. 65

(2d Cir. 1998). (holding that the Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a trivia quiz book that tests its readers'
recollection of scenes from Seinfeld unlawfully copies from the show and this copying does not

constitute fair use).
63 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciar,, 97th

Cong., 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). Virtually the same argument
was accepted by the Napster court, which characterized private copying in that case as commercial because it substituted for purchase of the materials. Napster. 239 F.3d at 10 14-15. Since a
copyright holder will always license material at some price, such a broad interpretation of commerciality would of course render nearly every putative fair use commercial.
64 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 452 ("[P]laintiffs have marketing alternatives at hand to recoup

some of that predicted loss").
65 Sony, 464 U.S. at 793. The majority offers no empirical evidence of the proposition
that "the live viewer is no more likely to buy prerecorded videotapes than is the time-shifter."
Id. There is not even a reference to the district court's findings. The majority should have left
this point alone, or at least prefaced it with the more proper observation that the respondents
failed to demonstrate via a preponderance of the evidence that time shifting does not dampen
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The first point needed a bit more exposition-namely, that the copyright holders weren't branding those who ignored commercials as
"free loaders" deserving a lawsuit, and that a certain percentage of
missed commercials seemed to be built into their business model.
Certainly it was bound to lose some force as technologies of fastforwarding advanced. Yet there is an unmistakable moral appeal to
the second argument-that the copyright holders would not even be
able to exploit the market for tapes in any way if it weren't for the
invention (and prevalence) of the VTR.
Whatever the validity of the court's predictions about the viewing
habits of time-shifters, its equitable point still resonates to this day.
The majority did not allow the usual binary, property-rule logic of
copyright to dictate copyright holders' effective control over every
new technology of dissemination. 66 As the glacial progression of
HDTV has shown once again, disruptive 67 new technologies of dissemination often face a chicken-and-egg problem: no one wants to
buy the hardware until they can be assured that the content will be
there; but no one wants to develop the content until they know the
hardware will be available. Here, the Court effectively rewarded
Sony for developing and marketing a new technology without getting
absolute assurance that it would be sued out of existence. A similar
dynamic promoted the rise of the radio and cable television industries,
which are great sources of advertising and revenue for content providers.
Complementing the moral appeal of this point, the majority offered sound economic reasoning for declaring time-shifting a fair use.
Like the district court, it "rejected respondents' prediction 'that live
television or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative,"' observing that "[t]here is no factual
basis for [the underlying] assumption. 68 The majority also agreed
with the district court's conclusion that, the Studios had "'marketing

demand for prerecorded videotapes.
66 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001) (arguing that when copyright holders attempt to eliminate a new kind of dissemination, courts will not find infringement when the courts do not deem
the dissemination to be harmful).
67 PEER TO PEER: HARNESSING THE POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Andy Oram,
ed., 2001); see also CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW

TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997) (discussing disruptive technologies in

several industries).
68 Sony, 464 U.S. at 452-53. The majority stated that the district court "rejected respondents' fear that persons 'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the
live audience and the ratings and revenues will decrease by observing that current measurement
technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. " Id. at 452.
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alternatives at hand to recoup some of that predicted lOSS,' ' 6 9 since
"[plaintiffs] stand ready to make their product available in cassettes
and compete with the VTR industry. 7 ° In other words, the onus was
on the copyright holders to adjust to the new technology, and not vice
versa.
Assuming the development of future "marketing alternatives" may
appear to be a facile response to copyright holders' concerns about
losing control of their work. However, the Sony court could rely on
evidence that the VTR had already enhanced the value of the copyrights at issue in many ways, and would continue to do so. The fastforwarding audience lost to advertisers may well have been offset by
those who, once consigned by work or "counterprogramming" 71 to
miss shows, now would be able to view them later.72 Quoting the
district court's summary of its fair use finding, the majority explained:
The audience benefits from the time-shifting capability have
already been discussed. It is not implausible that benefits
could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and advertisers,
as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view
their broadcasts.73
Here the majority explicitly acknowledged the very real possibility of
lost viewers and advertising dollars for the plaintiffs.74 However, it
also factored in the potential benefits of widespread VTR distribution,
and presciently concluded that these new opportunities would swamp
its negative effects. The Sony majority recognized that "effect on the
market" analysis should not end with a determination that a contested
use would potentially have negative effects on a potential market for
copyrighted work. Potential positive effects are relevant as well.

69 Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 452.
70

Id.

71 Id. (discussing this industry practice of placing two or three highly rated shows in the

same, desirable time slot to compete against one another).
72 For a nice list of potential economic effects of the VCR, with particular attention to the
economics of advertising, see S. J. Liebowitz, The Economics of Betamax: Unauthorized Copying of Advertising Based Television Broadcasts(1985), at

http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/betamax.pdf (listing potential economic effects of the
VCR with particular attention to the economics of advertising).
73 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (quoting from district court).

74 See id. Compare id with A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (refusing to acknowledge positive effects once the court determined that Napster would
harm the plaintiffs' entry into digital distribution markets).
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D. The NarrowApproach of the Dissent
Against this comprehensive examination of the effects of the VTR,
Justice Blackmun's dissent insisted that a putative infringer can only
prove fair use by "demonstrating that he had not impaired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation from (or to deny access
to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear
the copyrighted work., 75 As an extremely strong version of the
"market failure" approach to fair use,76 such an approach would eviscerate the fair use doctrine and restructure fair use doctrine in an absurd way.77 First, the dissent appeared to forget that "effect on the
market" is only one face of the fair use inquiry. To insist that the
plaintiff need prevail on this factor, in order to demonstrate fair use
overall, is not a position that even the most aggressive copyright expansionist would take today.
Second, the dissent deployed a disarmingly simple interpretive
strategy in order to advance its extremely restrictive idea of fourth
factor analysis. A lengthy quote is necessary in order to illuminate
the dissent's misinterpretation:
The District Court's analysis of harm, moreover, failed to
consider the effect of VTR recording on "the potentialmarket
for or the value of the copyrighted work," as required by §
107(4). The requirement that a putatively infringing use of a
copyrighted work, to be "fair," must not impair a "potential"
market for the work has [an important implication]. [A]n infringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's action.
Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has resulted in a
net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice. Rather,
the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the
copyright holder's ability to demand compensation from (or
to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing
to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work.78

75Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
76See Africa, supra note 11 (arguing that the market failure theory does not adequately
account for valuable uses of copyrighted work).
77See Michael Smith, Is That All There Is? (Draft for Journal of Ethics Special Issue on
Joel Feinberg), available at

(Mar. 18,
http://www.princeton.edu/-msmith/mypapers/Is%20that%20all%20there%20is.pdf
2005) (writing that in absurd activities "there is no relationship between [the activity] and anything that has value ....Absurd attitudes are epitomised by beliefs that are arrived at on the
basis of clearly fallacious reasoning.").
78Sony, 465 U.S. at 484-85.
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The dissent facilely equates the statutory requirement to consider the
effect of the use on "the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work" with an examination of the effect of the use on one
potential use of the work-namely, that which would have to be licensed if the use at issue were not to be declared fair. If section
107(4) did not effectively define "market" broadly by equating it with
the "value of' the copyrighted work, 79 this decision to define "market" as a small subdivision of potential licensees would perhaps be
defensible purely as a matter of cabining the meaning of an ambiguous term.
However, such a crabbed interpretation would be illogical in the
larger context of fair use analysis. As Lydia Pallas Loren has noted,
"[t]he argument that 'lost' permission fees are proof of fourth factor
harm has as its premise the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at
issue is not a fair use and, therefore, the owner is allowed to charge
permission fees for such use."8 ° Proof of lost licensing revenue is
possible in any contemporary fair use case. It's in the very nature of a
"test" or "factor" that it be possible for it to go in either direction;
however, Justice Blackmun's interpretation means it can only militate
against the defendant, barring a concession from the plaintiff that the
work does not reduce the value of the work.
Unfortunately, a milder version of Blackmun's narrow approach
crept into the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on fair use,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 81 In that case, the plaintiff sued the group
2 Live Crew for appropriating parts of the Roy Orbison song
"Pretty Woman" into a Rabelaisian mockery of unattractive and
unfaithful women.8 2 The case is largely remembered for its first
factor analysis affirming the importance of parody in fair use jurisprudence. Despite finding 2 Live Crew's rap to be a parody, the
Court remanded the case for further consideration by the district
79 In § 107(4), we are clearly not dealing with the disjunctive "or" but with the synonymous "or" denoting the equivalence of the terms "potential market" and "value of .... Or" is
often "[u]sed to indicate a synonymous or equivalent expression." The American Heritage®
Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition (2000), via Dictionary.com.
80 Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach To Fair Use In An Era Of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 1 (1997), available at
http://www.lclark.edu/-loren/articles/fairuse.htm; see also NIMMER, supra note 7, at

§ 13.05[A][4] (extensively discussing the circularity problem); Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair
Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 347, 359 (1997) ("[Tihe ability to
charge by itself cannot possibly determine legal rights. A hoodlum might have the ability to
charge protection fees, and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a right to do
that .... Absent an underlying theory of rights, the ability to charge is normatively meaningless.").
81 510 U.S. 569.
82 Id. at 572-73.
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court, including a fourth factor inquiry into the degree to which 2
Live Crew's rap reduced the value of the song via displacement
(rather than disparagement) 83:
2 Live Crew's song comprises not only parody but also rap
music, and the derivative market for rap music is a proper focus of enquiry. Evidence of substantial harm to it would
weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of
derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation
of originals .... [Therefore, each side should submit on remand] evidence or affidavits addressing the likely effect of 2
Live Crew's parodic rap song on the84 market for a nonparody,
rap version of 'Oh, Pretty Woman.'
Of course, the Court only deemed the derivative market for rap
music "a proper focus of enquiry," not the proper focus of enquiry
(as the Sony dissent would have it). Campbell did recognize the
validity of 2 Live Crew's submission of evidence that its version
of the song did not harm the market for the original song, and
might actually increase its notoriety. 85 However, the majority's
insistence that "a silent record on [the derivative rap market] disentitled the proponent of the defense, 2 Live Crew, to summary
judgment" elevated the importance of derivative markets to an
As David Nimmer's recent survey of fair
unfortunate extent.8 6
use cases has shown, appellate courts have been quick to seize on
harm to narrowly construed derivative markets as the key to fourth
factor inquiry, and have ignored Campbell's parallel approbation
83 This classic distinction in fair use law is intended to exempt certain negative affects on
the market from being considered in the fourth factor inquiry. If a scathing review or cutting
parody reduces sales for a work, it has most likely done so by disparaging the work. This kind
of market harm is not counted. However, an abridgment of the work or unauthorized copy may
usurp sales simply by substituting for the work. That market harm is counted in the fourth
factor inquiry. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. ("Because 'parody may quite legitimately aim
at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically,' the role of the courts
is to distinguish between "biting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it."
84 Id. at 593 (citing see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568); Nimmer, supra note 7
§ 13.05[A][4], p. 13-102.61 ("a substantially adverse impact on the potential market"); William
F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 697-98 (1992) (same).
85Campbell, 510 U.S. at n.21.
86Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. "Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent
would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence
about relevant markets. In moving for summary judgment, 2 Live Crew left themselves at just
such a disadvantage when they failed to address the effect on the market for rap derivatives,
and confined themselves to uncontroverted submissions that there was no likely effect on the
market for the original".
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of defense evidence showing positive effects on the market for the
work. 7
This misinterpretation of Campbell has most likely tempted courts
because of its ease of administration. Most judges are not experts on
the valuation of intellectual property. However, as the district court
in Sony demonstrated, courts are capable of a careful analysis of the
overall effect of a contested use on the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. The work of the district court in Sony, affirmed by the Supreme Court, is a model for resolving fourth factor
analysis.
III. THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR BROAD FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS
Sony's broad fourth factor analysis has reflected the district court's
deep appreciation of the economic background of the case. The Court
refused to assume that the market for entertainment goods would remain static, and instead focused on the new commercial possibilities
enabled by the contested use. This patience proved wise in retrospect,
although, as I've already acknowledged, no one could have predicted
at the time just how profitable tape rentals would have been for the
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the rapid development of information economics provides current courts with good reason for being skeptical
about copyright holders' claims of imminent ruin on account of new
technologies of dissemination.
Before delving into more recent research, it's helpful to defamiliarize the Sony plaintiffs' complaint by situating intellectual property
in the larger scheme of commercial relationships prevalent in a market economy. 89 Like symbiosis and parasitism in ecology, complementarity and competition pervade every economic system. Just as
early courts resisted conceptualizing competition as a tort (thereby
refusing to force a market entrant to compensate incumbent firms for
business lost due to its entry), we now believe that a viable market
cannot stand too many efforts to internalize all the positive effects of
87 Nimmer, supra note 7.
88 Courts may not be entirely to blame here. Copyright defendants are often strapped for

resources and unable to find the kind of economic experts capable of developing "positive
effects" evidence. However, even when they do, skeptical trial courts may fault the methodology of the studies or the credentials of the expert. See district court opinion in Napster (refusing
to credit the expert evidence of Napster's economist).
89 This is an aesthetic and argumentative strategy devised by Russian Formalist literary
critics, who argued that one of the main social functions of literature was to "defamiliarize," to
"counter the deadening effect of habit and convention by investing the familiar with strangeness
and thereby deautomatizing perception." Greig E. Henderson & Christopher Brown, GLOSSARY
OF LITERARY THEORY, at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/utelglossary/Defamiliarization.html
(last modified Mar. 31, 1997).
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a product or service to its provider. Countering arguments that would
later prevail in the case of digital audio tape ("DAT") technology,
Stan Liebowitz argued that the case of Sony's "appropriation" of the
value of televised content was no different than that of other situations where an ostensibly parasitic product actually established a
symbiotic relationship:
VCR manufacturers earn revenues selling a product which
would, for practical purposes, have little value if not for the
existence of copyrighted intellectual products. Notice, however, that an identical argument can be made for the producers of television sets, TV guides, antennae, Neilsen ratings,
TV stands, etc.. All these products are strong complements
with television programming and are "exploiting" the television market to earn revenues. Should they all pay a portion of
their revenues to copyright owners (as cable television ownof over-the-air
now do for retransmission
ers
should pay part
owners
copyright
broadcasts)? . . . Perhaps
complementhese
of their revenues to the manufacturers of
9"
tary products?
Seen in this light, the content providers appear like the avaricious
candle-sellers of Bastiat's parody, who petition the government to
block the sun in order to increase their sales. 9 ' They are trying to
90 Liebowitz, supra note 72, at 18. (concluding that the "net impact of VCR's" is ultimately negligible, and therefore "VCR use should be considered an exception to copyright
infringement since no diminution of creative activity is likely to follow from VCR use and users
would clearly benefit."). Liebowitz goes on to argue:
There are many other complementary products in the world (gasoline production/distribution and automobiles, electricity and appliances, floor cleaners and
floors, etc.) and if one believes that the producers of one complementary good should
pay producers of other complementary goods for the right to "exploit" the market for
the joint product, there is no limit to the potential scope of taxes and subsidies. In
addition, it is not at all clear on whom the taxes should be levied. After all, what
would be the worth of television programs without the physical means of reproducing them over-the-air, or a guide to allow viewers to learn when particular shows
were being broadcast?
Id.
91 See Frederic Bastiat, PETITION FROM THE MANUFACTURERS OF CANDLES, TAPPERS,
LANTERNS, STICKS, STREET LAMPS, SNUFFERS, AND EXTINGUISHERS, AND FROM PRODUCERS
OF TALLOW OIL, RESIN, ALCOHOL, AND GENERALLY OF EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH

LIGHTING (1845), at http://bastiat.org/en/petition.html [hereinafter Petition].

As the district

court chided the plaintiffs:

[T]here is no way, nor should there be, for plaintiffs to limit the availability of alternatives to television viewing. Games, books, movies even people all divert potential
viewers from the television set. It is impossible for plaintiffs or this court to isolate
the diversion of Betamax from that of these competitors.
Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 466. Their position recalled that of the lighting industry lampooned by
Bastiat:
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leverage public concern about the classic "free-rider" problem of intellectual property production into control over the value of all positive externalities arising from their products.92
As the story of the VCR demonstrates, this strategy may not only
hurt society, but also prove self-defeating for the copyright holders
themselves. 93 No doubt today's industry associations and lawyers
will brandish sophisticated revenue projections and threats of harm
when they press their case against fair use in the courts. They will
deride a laissez-faire approach as disrespectful of the property rights
of their clients. However, the divergence of principals' and agents'
94
interests may be distorting industry response to the P2P "crisis.,
Two aspects of contemporary information economics-network ef-

We are suffering from the ruinous competition of a rival who apparently works under
conditions so far superior to our own for the production of light that he is flooding
the domestic market with it at an incredibly low price; for the moment he appears,
our sales cease, all the consumers turn to him, and a branch of French industry whose
ramifications are innumerable is all at once reduced to complete stagnation. This rival, which is none other than the sun, is waging war on us so mercilessly we suspect
he is being stirred up against us by perfidious [England].
Petition, supra note 91. The libertarian/right critique of expansive intellectual property rights
has been developing for some time; see, e.g., Jesse Walker, Copy Catfight, Reason, Mar. 2000,
at 44; James Boyle, Conservatives and Intellectual Property, Address Before the National
Federalist Society Annual Meeting (2000) in I ENGAGE 83 (2000), available at
http://www.james-boyle.com/ (arguing that we should protect intellectual property only when it
is necessary to protect future innovation).
92 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding (unpublished
manuscript, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 291), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=582602 (Aug. 2004). Lemley explained:
The economics of property is concerned with internalizing negative
externalities - harms that one person's use of land does to another's interest to it, as in
the familiar tragedy of the commons. But the externalities in intellectual property are
positive, not negative, and property theory offers little or no justification for internalizing positive externalities. Indeed, doing so is at odds with the logic and functioning
of the market.
Id.; see also WILLIAM BAUMOL & ALAN BLINDER, ECONOMICS 613 (1991) ("An activity is said
to generate a beneficial or detrimental externality if that activity causes incidental benefits or
damages to others, and no corresponding compensation is provided to or paid by those who
generate the externality.").
93 Fisher, supra note 57, at A23. Reviewing struggles between copyright holders and developers of new technologies, William Fisher observed:
It is noteworthy that the story with the happiest ending-both for the public and for
the copyright owners-was the one in which the owners were denied any share in the
revenues earned by the developers of the new technology but instead had to develop
a new business model to take advantage of it (VCR's).
Id.
94 Skeptics have long attempted to document some divergence between the interests of
pulic interest lawyers and those they claim to represent. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 341 (1991). Itis not unimagin-

able that lawyers for content industries have more to gain from endless litigation over unauthorized use than from a less litigious business strategy focused more on maximizing paid uses
rather than minimizing unauthorized use.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55:4

fects and demand analysis-demonstrate the complexity inherent in
any determination of the effect of an unauthorized use on the market
for a copyrighted work.
A.

Network Effects

Regardless of the net social benefit of fair use decisions, there is
growing evidence that the copyright holders' efforts to expand the
scope of their control over their work is not only inefficient for the
economy as a whole, but also for the copyright holders themselves.
Given the complexity of information economics, any particular use of
a copyrighted work is likely to have not only negative, substitution
effects on the market for the work, but also positive, complementary
effects.9 5 For example, unauthorized users of a software program
may help the program become an "industry standard," may suggest
improvements to the program in user communities, or may eventually
purchase a license (once they have the money to buy it-or the
money to lose in an infringement action) .96 The Sony court presciently (albeit obscurely) grasped the power of such network effects
and complementary goods in creative industries.97 Network effects
enable positive feedback loops in the consumption of both content
and the media that carry it: 98
Network externalities9 9 arise when the utility that a user derives from a product increases with the number of other individuals who also use the product. These externalities have
95 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the distinction between complementary and substitutional copying). Building on his coauthored work
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003), Judge Richard Posner

advanced the basic microeconomic concept of complementary and substitute goods in copyright
law. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 121 (2003) (noting that Ty, Inc. is an example of negative harmimplied consent as the deliberate shortage of "Beanie Babies" creates a secondary market giving
publicity).
% Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 51-79 (2001). Shy has observed
that "piracy has two economic impacts on software firms. First, piracy leads to a fall in direct
sales. However, by increasing the size of the installed base, it may also boost the demand for
the particular software." Id. (citing to Kathleen Reavis Conner and Richard P. Rumelt, Software
Piracy:An Analysis of Protection Strategies, in 37 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 125 (1991)).
97 See CAVES, supra note 39, at 17 (1998) (discussing the idiosyncratic features of supply
and demand for content); see also CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1999)
(discussing supply and demand of information and the tools used for its distribution and storage).
98Mark Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
99 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 92, at 613 ("An activity is said to generate a beneficial or detrimental externality if that activity causes incidental benefits or damages to others,
and no corresponding compensation is provided to or paid by those who generate the externality.").
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several sources. Direct network externalities exist when the
number of users affects the quality of the product itself.
Communications products such as telephones and fax machines exhibit this type of effect, as these products become
more useful as more individuals obtain them. Indirect network externalities exist when the number of users affects the
availability of complementary products and services, which
in turn affects the value of the core product.1°°
The more uses-authorized or unauthorized-of a product, the more
noteworthy, popular, and important the product is likely to become. ' 01
Network effects prevail in a variety of industries, including "the
telephone, email, Internet, computer hardware, computer software,
music players, music titles, video players, video movies, banking services, airline services, legal services, and many more."'' 0 2 As Oz Shy
explains, all these industries exhibit "complementarity, compatibility,
standards, consumption externalities, switching costs, significant
economies of scale, and lock-in."' 3 Expanding on the traditional
microeconomic definition of complementarity, Shy explains that
"[c]omplementarity means that consumers in these markets are shopping for systems (e.g., computers and software, cameras and film,
music players and cassettes) rather than individual products.
Whenever this occurs, the increasing prevalence or standardization of
any one component of the system can greatly increase the demand for
other components of the system.
Just such a dynamic opened up the vast market of video rentals
to film and television copyright holders after the Sony decision. In
1981, the President of the Motion Picture Association of America,
Jack Valenti, claimed that "we are going to bleed and bleed and

100
Dana R.

Wagner, The Keepers Of The Gates: Intellectual Property,Antitrust, and the

Regulatory Implications Of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1073, 1096 (2000).
101
The product may even become necessary, as in the case of telephones, email, or even

lawyers:
Our major observation is that the fees collected by lawyers have increased significantly despite the rapid increase in the number of lawyers. This observation is rather
puzzling since it seems to contradict the law of demand and supply which predicts
that wages (attorney's fees in the present case) should decline with the increase in
the number of people in the profession ....
.... In order to demonstrate this possibility, we will utilize a network model of attorneys where the increase in the number of practicing lawyers creates a disproportional increase in the demand for lawyers.
SHY, supra note 96, at 270 (2001).
I02 Id. at 1.
03
1 Id. at 7.
104Id. at 2.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55:4

hemorrhage, unless this Congress at least protects one
industry ... whose total future depends on its protection from the
savagery and the ravages of this machine."'' 0 5 Ultimately, the reverse happened: the video rental business unleashed a transfusion
of cash' 0 6 to Hollywood as a vast new market for its works developed. 10 7 Moreover, movie ticket sales were not displaced. As
Valenti himself put it (near the time of his retirement in 2004):
"[I]n spite of this spiraling competition, unharnessed and unbounded, where new contenders for viewers' favor sprout up like
kudzu, all aiming to lure consumers to their new
enticements0 8 ... the movie theater still enchants, still beckons, still
'

prospers."'

To be sure, had the film industry won the Sony case, some version of the VCR likely would have developed under its control.
But like the digital video recorders hobbled by digital rights management, 1°9 or the MP3 players crippled by endless disputes over
content controls," ° such a technology would likely have taken far
longer to diffuse."' Like digital audio tape recorders, it may well
have been done in by excessive regulation. 1 2 Fortunately for
home viewers and the entertainment industry, neither the Supreme

105
Home Recordings of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts,
th
the Judiciary, 97
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On
Cong. (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.), available at
http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm.
106This florid mixed metaphor is my tribute to Valenti' s mastery of that form.
107See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED

313 (1987) ("the gross revenues from the sale and rental of videocassettes-a projected $3.5
billion by 1985-were closing in on the gross revenues of the theatrical movie business.").
Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Valenti Reports 2003 Box
108
Office as Second Highest in History at ShoWest, available at
http://ww~v.mpaa.org/jack/content.htm (last visited March 23, 2004).
109See generally, Am. Library Ass'n v. F.C.C., 401 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, 17 F.C.C.R. 16, 027 (2002).
110
For the latest installment in a long, sad story (dating back at least to the collapse of the
Secure Digital Music Initiative), see Derek Slater, Sony Music-Tech Makes Me Wanna Retch,
available at http:/Iblogs.law.harvard.edulcmusings/2004/05/10#a659 (May 10, 2004).
111For the leading analysis of technological diffusion in the legal literature, see Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH L. REV. 1035 (2002).
I2 Congress forced the manufacturers of this technology to install a "Serial Copyright
Management System" and to pay royalties to copyright holders. Audio Home Recording Act
("AHRA") of 1992, 17 U.S.C. 1001-1010 (2000). Many commentators have concluded that the
combination of a "duty to design" and a "duty to pay" in this context doomed the technology to
obsolescence (although the rise of the CD was also a large part of the story). The sluggish
growth of webcasting is also largely attributable to the crippling effect of laws like the Digital
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act ("DPSRA") of 1995 and the royalties it established.
See Pub. L. No. 104-39, Sec. 1, 109 Stat. 336 (1995); Details of the act's operative
mechanisms are available at http://www.soundexchange.com. In contrast, terrestrial radio was
not hobbled by such regulation or court cases.
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Court nor Congress decided to impose burdensome liability or
regulation on VCR manufacturers.
B. Demand Analysis
Industrial economist Richard Caves has investigated the organization of creative activities-"why some creative activities occur in
ongoing organizations ('firms'), and others in one-off deals ('the
market')."'1 3 Caves's rich empirical study of various "creative industries" (those in which the product or service "contains a substantial
amount of artistic or creative endeavor") is organized around several
common themes. On the demand side, the uncertainty of demand
leads to the "nobody knows" problem: "[t]here is great uncertainty
about how consumers will value a newly produced creative product,
'' 14
short of actually producing the good and placing it before them."
Since costs are often sunk," 5 "the risk associated with any creative
'
product is high." 16
This uncertainty is often cited as a reason for guaranteeing strong
IP rights. Without such rights, IP producers may not be given adequate incentives to produce such goods. However, markets for information have also developed methods of dealing with uncertain
demand that depend on robust exceptions and limitations to TP rights.
For instance, reviewers are allowed to quote freely from a text in the
course of reviewing it. Such "fair uses" are not obviously helpful to
the book in question-harsh reviews may drive down sales. However, unlicensed reviews are, in general, an essential tool for generating more information about books and encouraging sales.' 7
Reviews are but one of many ways buyers and sellers overcome
the problem of assessing the value of experience goods-those which
must be experienced before a buyer can understand its value or appeal."18 As Hal Varian and Carl Shapiro demonstrate, there are many
113CAVES,supra
1i4CAVES,

note 39, at 1-2.
supra note 39, at 2.

115A sunk cost is a cost

[t]o which a firm is precommitted for some limited period, either because the firm
has signed a contract to make the payments or because the firm has already paid for
some durable item (such as a machine or a factory) and cannot get its money back
except by using that item to produce output for some period of time.
BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 92, at 493. Less formally, a sunk cost may be considered one
that has already been made and cannot be recovered; for example, the performance of an actor
in a film, or the copyright for a song that is played during the film.
116CAVES, supra note 39, at 3.
17
1 See infra Part IV.B.2. (addressing the economic benefit of general right to review and
quote). 8
'1
See Hal R. Varian, Markets for Infornation Goods, at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/apan/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). Cf.
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:4

strategies that makers of an information good can deploy in order to
overcome consumers' unwillingness to buy an experience good they
have not experienced.
1. Previewing/Browsing
When consumers can preview and browse works, they are far more
likely to purchase them than when the goods are essentially a black
box. Several publishers have responded to this phenomenon by making their works available online for browsing. For example:
The National Academy of Sciences Press found that when
they posted the full text of books on the Web, the sales of
those books went up by a factor of three. Posting the material
on the Web allowed potential customers to preview the material, but anyone who really wanted to read the book would
download it. MIT Press had119a similar experience with monographs and online journals.
Like a phonebook that identifies all the providers of services in a
given area, previewing and browsing services give customers some
sense of what is available and what they are buying. Major music
retailers now brag that one can sample nearly every CD on their
shelves. 120
This model of owner-approved or-organized browsing works
well when consumers 121 have a clear idea of what they are looking
for. Given the exponential expansion of literary, film, music, and
software offerings, this is not always the case. In such markets, retailers, "buffs"' 2 2 and others with educated tastes or an interest in selling the work can be crucial to solving collective action problems.
Recently, Amazon announced a revolutionary cataloging feature that
allows site visitors to search for words and phrases in all the pages of

CAVES, supra note 39, at 3 (describing the particularly acute "experience good" problem in the
context of creative goods: "A creative product is an 'experience good' like these, but the buyer's
satisfaction will be a subjective reaction .... The organizational problem is to deal with symmetrical ignorance, not asymmetrical information.").
119Id.
th
120Barnes and Noble at 12 and F in D.C.; Manhattan Union Square.
a broad enough term-cf. article on user rights, and my general
not
be
may
Consumers
121
theme that the purchasers/users of IP may be creators themselves (esp. in context of fan fiction,
amazon.com reviews, etc.); cf Tim Wu, Harry Potterand InternationalOrder of Copyright, at
http://www.slate.msn.com./id/2084960/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
2
See CAVES, supra note 39, at 185-86 (describing buffs as "people who cultivate exhaustive knowledge of the activity and likely possess some training or experience in creative activity.").
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a digitized collection of approximately 100,000 books that Amazon
offers for sale:
The copyrights to these titles are spread among countless
owners. How was it possible to create a publicly accessible
database from material whose ownership is so tangled?
Amazon's solution is audacious: The company simply denies
it has built an electronic library at all ....

You can find the

page that responds to your query, read it on your screen, and
browse a few pages backward and forward. But you cannot
download, copy, or read the book from beginning to end.
There is no way to link directly to any page of a book. If you
want to read an extensive excerpt, you must turn to the
physical volume-which, of course, you can conveniently
purchase from Amazon. Users will be asked to give their
credit card number before looking at pages in the archive, and
they won't be able to view more than a few thousand 23pages
per month, or more than 20 percent of any single book. 1
Amazon has both the market power and the savvy transactional lawyers to avoid lawsuits over the service. 24 However, other innovators
have not been so lucky. Arriba Soft, the creator of an archive of
internet images, has been in litigation over its site with one
holdout-an obscure landscape photographer-for years. 25 Video
Pipeline's archive of brief clips from movies was effectively shut
down by a recent district court opinion affirmed by the Third Circuit. 26 The Arriba Soft panel took seriously the positive effects of a
previewing service on the market for intellectual property previewed
in it, while the Buena Vista panel effectively ruled that owners of the
previewed IP must consent to its (or any part of its) inclusion in any
database-extending the logic of Justice Blackmun's fourth factor
"analysis" into a per se rule against unauthorized uses with commercial potential.

23

Gary Wolf, The Great Library of Amazon, at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 1/12/amazon-pr.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
124 Although it has caved to pressure from the authors guild to prevent print-outs of the
pages found via the "look inside the book" feature. Wired.com, Amazon: Look But Don't
Touch, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,61057,00.html (last visited Mar. 27,
1

2005). 2 5

1 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). This is a classic hold-out
problem, making fair use appropriate as an eminent domain type strategy. See Michael A.
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
126Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp 2d. 321 (D. N.J.
2002), aff'd, 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1178 (2004).
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2. Reputation and Reviews
Varian also notes that many producers of information products
overcome the "experience good" problem by consistently providing
an excellent product, thus building a reputation for quality. 127 I've
rarely seen an issue of the New York Times without at least one interesting article, so I continue buying it; weblogs like politicaltheory.info and aldaily.com have also earned a spot in my "Favorites"
directory by consistently pointing me to new ideas or well-written

articles. The power of reputation is even stronger in movies and music, where established star performers (as well as writers, producers,

and even costumers) can command princely sums for their services.
Buyers of computer software are often afraid of purchasing products
from unknown companies, and are generally willing to pay a premium in order to buy an established brand.
The law of intellectual property primarily responds to the importance of reputation in "creative industries" by providing strong trademark protection. 128 Trademarks and trade dress can clearly designate

action
the source of products because their owners have a cause12 of
9

against anyone who causes confusion or "dilutes" the mark.
However, when we move beyond the field of source designation to
the protection of products themselves, adequate institutional signals
of reputation may also depend on owners' inability to strictly control
all uses of their work-particularly with respect to the rights afforded
by copyright protection. For example, book reviews would mean
little if they could only quote from a book after obtaining permission

from the book's copyright owner. 130 I would rarely send articles from
the New York Times website to friends if I had to pay a fee each time I
sent one. 1 31 And it is likely that the bloggers who now generate traf127Richard Lethin, Reputation, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 70, at 341.
128See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Trade-Mark Act), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1141
(2005) (creating protection for trademarks and providing a cause of action for an infringement);
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125-1127 (2005) (providing a cause
of action
for dilution of the distinctive quality of famous marks).
29
1 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995):
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, 'for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that [a particular item] is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in
the past
(second alteration in original) (quoting 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition § 2.01[2] (3d. ed. 1992)).
130See note supra 33 and accompanying text.
131Admittedly, micropayments may lessen that problem. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure, supra note 9. The problem, though, is that the copyright owner is ill-equipped to judge
whether the micropayment revenues are adequate to offset the reputational advantages accruing
to the publication from unauthorized distribution by those who note-that may be why the Los
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fic for such sites would not do so if they were not allowed to link to
such sites.132 A restaurant guide unable to reproduce photographs of
restaurants would be much less valuable to epicureans who also seek
to know something of the ambiance of where they will be dining.
Admittedly, in each of these cases it is difficult to assess the relative contribution of each party to each party's economic success.
Perhaps bloggers like freerepublic.com or andrewsullivan.com are
ultimately parasites on established publications like the New York
Times; or perhaps they would command an audience even without
such links and quotes and the Times free-rides off the publicity they
provide. It's hard to even imagine a behavioral study that could settle
questions like this. However, a relationship of symbiosis or commensalism is indisputable-both sides benefit from a vital information
ecology where journalists, bloggers, reviewers, and established publications can freely quote, cite and link to each other's work.
IV. CONCLUSION

A specter haunts fair use scholarship-a defeatist intuition that fair
use cases are essentially untheorizable. In his 1990 article "Fair's
Fair," Lloyd Weinreb offered the leading version of this argument.
Weinreb counsels complacency in the face of the complexity-and
outright contradictions-evident in leading fair use cases. 33 Since
every case is different, every application of the four fair use factors is
going to be renewed afresh. There's little room for the treatise-writer,
much less the theorist, to order matters-especially given new technological developments that can scarcely be predicted months in advance, let alone the years and decades that theoreticians aspire to influence.
However, even if we accept the equitable character of fair use determinations, and the exceptionally context-sensitive application of
the fair use factors, there are nevertheless some ideas of order that
emerge from the cases. A particularly persuasive analysis of the

Angeles Times and The Washington Post settled the Free Republic suit on such good terms for
the other side (namely, payment of only nominal damages of roughly $5,000 to each plaintiff).
132See Shirky, supra note 9; but see Liebowitz's endorsement of micropayment systems in
Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the Networked Age, Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 438, 17
(May 15, 2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-438es.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2005) (praising DRM systems for producing price discrimination closely keyed to users' willingness to pay).
133Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair:A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1137 (1990) (recalling other defenses of "muddy" as opposed to "crystalline" property
law. Cf Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988);
Marc Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDoZO L. REV. 93 (2002).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:4

"purpose or character" of the use-like Judge Posner's treatment of
reviews and collector's guides in Ty Inc. v. PIL-may thereafter privilege a certain category of use as fair.1 34 And as I have argued above,
a deeply insightful analysis of the effect of a use on the market for the
affected copyright-such as Sony's treatment of this fourth fair use
factor-may disclose a method appropriate in a wide range of fair use
cases.
Sony's effect on the market analysis is exemplary for two reasons.
First, the case considered not only the negative, substitutive effects of
the contested copying on the market for the copyrighted works, but
also examined the positive, complementary effects. Against the copyright owners' complaints that VTR-owners would not buy tapes of
their programs once they had the opportunity to copy them off broadcast television, the Court noted that there would be no market for the
tapes were it not for the VTR's prevalence. Second, Sony either limited the range of "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed"
markets that could be claimed by the copyright owner, or determined
that negative effects in one such market would likely be swamped by
positive effects in other markets-thereby leading to a fourth factor
finding in favor of the defendants. Either interpretation of the case
expands the range of evidence that must be considered before a court
can deny a fair use defense.
Skeptics are sure to grumble that the broad method of market
analysis exemplified in Sony may overwhelm courts.1 35 However, the
Sony dissent's alternative only achieves simplicity at the cost of disrespecting the will of Congress and forsaking the judicial role of examining the full scope of the effects of a contested use on the value of
the works at issue. The narrow method is also circular, assuming the
very legal conclusion it purports to be determining.
Although Justice Breyer has done much to try to rationalize copyright law in his scholarship 136 and opinions 37 in copyright disputes,
his work in administrative law most directly inspires my work on the
topic. In his Breaking the Vicious Circle, Justice Breyer explained
how small increases in expertise and economic analysis at key gov-' Ty Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1110
(2003).
'35 William Fisher discussed this possibility in fair use analysis in his Reconstructing Fair
Use article. Sensitive to the problem of the non-representative litigant, William Fisher proposed
that courts consider "the universe of activities vis-a-vis" the copyrighted work when deciding
individual fair use cases. William W. Fisher I, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1706 (1988).
36
1 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
137Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ernment agencies could promote vastly better policy outcomes. 138
The Sony majority, affirming a method of "market analysis" that calls
upon litigants to fully research the effects of a use, ultimately came to
a similar conclusion with respect to fair use cases. Copyright disputes
are likely to influence the structure of the information economy in
profound ways. It is time for courts (and litigants) to treat them accordingly. One good first step would be to finally forsake the vicious
circularity of narrow fourth factor analysis for the comprehensive
approach envisioned by the drafters
of the 1976 Copyright Act and
139
employed by the Sony majority.
APPENDIX: RIVAL VIEWS OF THE MARKET EFFECTS OF VCRENABLED TAPING OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMING IN SONY

Area of Conflict
Initial Characterization of
Taping

Sony Majority

Sony Dissent

Noncommercial (fair) vs. Cornmercial (unfair) Use

Ordinary (unfair) vs.
Productive (fair) Use

Burden of
Proof

"A challenge to a noncommercial
use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use
is harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential

"Although the District
Court found no likelihood
of harm from VTR use, I
conclude that it applied an
incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the

market for the copyrighted work. .

burden of proof .... The

. If the intended use is for cornmercial gain, that likelihood [of
market harm] may be presumed.
But if it is for a noncommercial
purpose, the likelihood must be
40
demonstrated.',

Studios have demonstrated a
potential for harm, which
has not been, and could not
be, refuted at this early
stage of technological
de4
velopment.'1

"Because the Studios' prediction
of harm was 'based on so many
assumptions and on a system of
marketing which is rapidly changing,' the [district] court was 'hesieffects of
tant to identify probable
2

"[A] particular use which
may seem to have little or
no economic impact on the
author's rights today can
assume tremendous impor143
tance in times to come."'

"[The district court] rejected respondents' prediction 'that live

[A]dvertisers may be willing to pay for only 'live'

television or movie audiences will

viewing audiences, if they

Speculation

home-use copying."

Advertising

138STEVEN

BREYER,

BREAKING

14

THE

VICIOUS

CIRCLE:

TOWARD

EFFECTIVE

RISK

REGULATION (1994).

139
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2004).
140Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
141
Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted).
14
2 Id. at 484 (citing 480 F. Supp. 429, 468 (1979)).
143
Id. at 482 (alterations in the original) (dissent, quoting Register's Supplementary Report
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believe VTR viewers will
delete commercials or if
rating services are unable to
measure VTR use; if this is
the case, VTR recording
could reduce the license
fees the Studios are able to
charge even for first-run
showings.""'4
"[ilsolated instances of
minor infringements, when
multiplied many times,
become in the aggregate a
major inroad on copyright4
that must be prevented.' 1

decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative,"
with the observation that "[tihere
is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."'"
"To the extent any decrease in
advertising revenues would occur,
the court concluded that the Studios had 'marketing alternatives at
hand to recoup45some of that predicted loss.""

-

Market for
Reruns

t

"'Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the
original televised material and that
the more people there are in this
original audience, the fewer people
the rerun will attract. Yet current
marketing practices, including the
success of syndication, show just
the opposite. Today, the larger the
audience for the original telecast,
the higher the price plaintiffs can
demand from broadcasters from
rerun rights .... [I]f ratings can

reflect Betamax recording, original
audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid
plaintiffs
rather than harm
14
them ." 1

Potential
Markets for
the Work

"[R]espondents' suggestion that
'theater or film rental exhibition of
a program will suffer because of
time-shift recording of that pro15
gram lacks merit." ' "
"By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer

[Vol. 55:4

I

"'Proof of actual harm, or
even probable harm, may be
impossible in an area where
the effect of a new technology is speculative, and
requiring such proof would
present the 'real danger...
of confining the scope of an
author's rights on the basis
of the present technology so
that, as the years go by, his
copyright loses much of its
value because of unforeseen
technical advances.' Infringement thus would be
found if the copyright
owner demonstrates a reasonable possibility that
harm will result49from the
proposed use."'
[Tihe Studios and their
amici demonstrate that the
advent of the VTR technology created a potential
market for their copyrighted
programs. That market
consists of those persons
who find it impossible or

'44The district court "rejected respondents' fear that persons 'watching' the original telecast
of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will decrease, by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be
reflected." Id. at 452 (citing 480 F. Supp. 429, 466 (1979)) (alterations in the original).
"45 Id. at 484.
146Id. at 483.
'47Id. at 482 (citing S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65 (1975)).
148Id. at 453 n. 38.
49 Id. at 482 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
10 Id. at 453.
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be on tape when the later theater
run begins."''
[The majority also points out that
the only reason for the market for
tapes is the creation of the VTR.]

inconvenient to watch the
programs at the time they
are broadcast, and who wish
to watch them at other
times. These persons are
willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work at their convenience, as is evidenced by
the fact that they are willing
to pay for VTRs and tapes;
undoubtedly, most also
would be willing to pay
some kind of royalty to
copyright holders. The
Studios correctly argue that
they have been deprived of
the ability to exploit
this
52
sizable market.1

"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of
harm hinge on speculation about
audience viewing patterns and
ratings, a measurement system
which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant level of
imprecision involved in the calculations." 153

"[E]ven a showing that the
infringement has resulted in
a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice.
Rather, the infringer must
demonstrate that he had not
impaired the copyright
holder's ability to demand
compensation from (or to
deny access to) any group
who would otherwise be
willing to pay to see or hear
the copyrighted work. Second, the fact that a given
market for a copyrighted
work would not be available
to the copyright holder were
it not for the infringer's
activities does not permit
the infringer to exploit that
market without compensat-5 4
ing the copyright holder."'

Id. at 453 n. 39.
'52 1 d. at 485.
153 Id. at 452 (citing 480 F. Supp. 429, 468 (1979)).
54Id. at 485 (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)).
'

